In this essay I want to raise an objection to a widely held thesis among evangelicals. The objection comes in the form of a dillema, which means that either horn of the dilemma is a conclusion evangelicals would find distasteful.
I begin by stating what exactly is the widely held thesis. Its thought that if two people ascribe different attributes to God, then they must be worshiping different God’s. Ill call this the attribute thesis (AT). This thesis is routinely employed in conversations about Christians and non-christians. For example, someone will say, “Do Christians and Muslims worship the same God?” Someone will respond, “no, because they ascribe different attributes to God: Christians say God is three persons, Muslims say he is one.” As can be seen, the respondant believes that since both groups ascribe different attributes to God, they then must be worshiping different God’s. That is, he assumes the truth of AT. But as we’ll see, AT is too strong a thesis; for though it properly divides Christians from Muslims, it also divides Christian from Christian.
Now here is the dillema for AT. Consider:
If AT is true, then two people who call themselves Christians, and who ascribe different attributes to God, will be worshiping different God’s.
If AT is false, then Christians are not distinct from non-Christians; that is, two people may ascribe different attributes to God and still be worshiping the same God.
Let me explain the first horn of the dilemma. If AT is true, then not only are Muslims distinct from Christians, but Christians are distinct from Christians. Consider, surely any two Christians ascribe different attributes to God: some say God is in time, others say not; some say God has the title “Father”, others say he can have the title “Mother”; some say God knows what will happen, others say He knows only what could happen. But if there is attribute disagreement, then that means the two people worship different God’s. Although two people may attend the same Sunday service, since they ascribe different attributes to God, they must therefore be worshiping different God’s. This is one outcome many evangelicals will find most distasteful, and which is entailed by the truth of AT.
Let me now explain the second horn of the dilemma. What if AT is actually false? Although you avoid the distasteful outcome that Christians are distinct from Christians, if AT is false, then the Christian loses his ability to discriminate between Christian and non-Christian. For example, Christians routinely say that both Muslims and Jehovah’s Witness are outside the boundary of orthodoxy, that is, they are both false religions. And the reason these groups are outside the boundary of orthodoxy is partly because both groups ascribe different attributes to God (both say Gods is not three persons). But if AT is false, then the grounds for discrimination have been eliminated. That is, two people can ascribe different attributes to God and still be worshiping the same person. Therefore, contrary to the common belief of evangelicals, Christians, Muslims, and Jehovah’s Witness may be worshiping the same God after all, or at least the usual grounds for distinguishing between the groups is eliminated. Furthermore, perhaps all three groups are really part of one and the same religion. This is the second distasteful outcome.
Thus we have a dilemma. If AT is true, then one Christian is distinct from another Christian; a distasteful outcome. If AT is false, then the Christian cannot distinguish between himself and other religions; another distasteful outcome.
Is there a way out of the dilemma? I think so. One way out might be to refine AT by arguing that not any attribute disagreement entails a different God. This can be done by articulating essential and non-essential attributes of God. The former containing the resources to divide groups, the latter lacking such resources. That is, two people may disagree on non-essential attributes of God, and still worship the same God; but not so with essential attributes.
But where exactly do we make the divide between essential and non-essential attributes of God? This is our project.
Ric Saenz 
Chris Saenz 
Yeah, I just wanted to offer something different to consider, as you are already aware that I don’t buy into AT, as stated here:
http://www.lifeanddoctrine.org/essential-and-non-essential-attributes/#comment-44
In your response you focus entirely on the essentials and non-essentials. Did you have any objections to preceding part of my essay? Any qualms with the dilemma, my understanding of AT, my assumptions? I want to make sure we covered all the bases before we move on to the project, ie, defining essentials and non essentials.
In thinking about how Christians could divide essentials and non-essentials it seems good to bring up the church fathers’ proclamations of orthodoxy; mainly the creeds. How did they, in forming the various creeds, divide between essentials and non-essential. Or in other words, how did they decide which items should be inlcuded in the creeds (considered “essential”, to the degree that to oppose such essentials was to be “condemned” or “anathama”) and which should not; presumably because they were not “essential”.
I also think its important to note that the creeds not only include attributes of God, but “actions” of God. These “actions” come in the form of historical actions (“suffered, and the third day he rose again”) and relational actions (“for our salvation”). So perhaps there are other things to consider when trying to understand who is distinct from Christians.